// notes/ Practice Boxes
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Administrator — HTB (10.10.11.42)
Medium Windows AD box (HTB). Full-domain-compromise scenario starting from a low-priv credential, walking an ACL chain across users to DCSync.
#htb#htb#walkthrough#boxes#os:windows#tech:active-directory
Administrator — HTB (10.10.11.42)
Medium Windows AD box (HTB). Full-domain-compromise scenario starting from a low-priv credential, walking an ACL chain across users to DCSync.
Synopsis
Administrator is a medium-difficulty Windows machine designed around a complete domain compromise, where credentials for a low-privileged user are provided. The attack chain:
- olivia → michael — enumerate ACLs over privileged objects;
oliviahasGenericAllovermichael, so reset his password. - michael → benjamin —
michaelcan force a password change onbenjamin; reset it. - benjamin → FTP loot — access
FTPas benjamin, find abackup.psafe3(Password Safe) file. - Crack the safe — cracking
backup.psafe3reveals credentials for several users. - Spray → emily — password-spray the recovered creds; valid for
emily. - emily → ethan —
emilyhasGenericWriteoverethan→ targeted Kerberoasting; crack the recovered hash forethan's password. - ethan → Domain Admin —
ethanhas DCSync rights → dump theAdministratorNTLM hash → full domain compromise.
Information Gathering
Standard AD service surface (Kerberos 88, LDAP 389/3268, SMB 445, etc.). Begin with BloodHound after the provided low-priv creds to map the ACL paths above.
Key techniques
- ACL abuse:
GenericAll/GenericWrite(force password reset, targeted Kerberoast) - Password Safe (
.psafe3) cracking - Password spraying
- Kerberoasting
- DCSync for the domain Administrator hash